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Economic and Industrial Espionage: A Different 





The primary objective of this paper is to advance our understanding of inter-
organizational learning by introducing evidence of illegal learning across 
organizational boundaries. By drawing upon data from a largely unexplored area of 
management and organization studies, that of economic and industrial espionage, we 
attempt to demonstrate that contemporary debates could benefit considerably from 
an exploration of such illegal forms of learning. Three vignettes involving economic 
and industrial espionage are presented to demonstrate the limitations of both our 
current conceptualisations of inter-organizational learning and what motivates people 
to illegally acquire knowledge across organizational boundaries. In direct challenge to 
the dominant ‘black-box’ view of organizations presupposed by the sticky and leaky 
knowledge debate these vignettes present powerful evidence of external forces 
encouraging the forced leakage of knowledge. Resultantly our understanding of what 
constitutes sticky and leaky knowledge has to be adapted. Finally, we conclude with 
a discussion of the implications for future research 




In recent years learning across organizational boundaries has received 
increasing attention. Arguably built upon studies exploring inter-organizational 
relations in economics (Williamson, 1975), law (Macaulay, 1963) and strategy 
(Gulati, 1998; Reid et al, 2001), various forms of collaborative inter-
organizational activities have been presented as being organizationally 
beneficial. From studies examining how institutional structures influence inter-
organizational relations (Greewood et al 2002; Oliver, 1997), to attempts to 
improve supply chain efficiencies (Boddy et al, 2000; Harland, 1996), the 
potential benefits can be summarised in the following three ways. Firstly, 
inter-organizational collaboration might secure access to complementary 
assets needed to turn innovations into commercial successes (Hagedoorn, 
1993; Teece, 1986). Secondly, inter-organizational collaboration may allow 
organizations to spread the substantial cost of research and development 
(R&D) between collaborators (Hagedoorn, 2002; Veugelers, 1998). Finally, 
the transfer of codified and tacit knowledge (Ahuja, 2000; Doz and Hamel, 
1997; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Lambe and Spekman, 1997) could 
be facilitated by such alliances. 
 
The recent interest in inter-organizational learning can be seen as drawing 
heavily on the inter-organizational collaboration literature (Dodgson, 1996; 
Inkpen and Crossan, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Levinson and Asahi, 1995; Lyles, 
1988), in association with ideas from leading proponents of the value of 
knowledge in contemporary societies (Davenport and Prusak, 2000; Nonaka 
and Teece, 2001). In some cases, researchers discuss such learning in terms 
of knowledge sharing and transfer (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 1995; Kale et al., 2000; Mowery et al., 1996), where, for 
example, a focal organization learns from a strategic alliance partner (Lei and 
Slocum, 1992). In others, authors emphasise that through collaboration new 
knowledge, of which neither collaborating partner was previously aware, can 
be created (e.g., Gulati, 1999; Mowery et al., 1996; Powell et al, 1996).  
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 In such inter-organizational relations, the crucial issue to be addressed is the  
management of learning across boundaries where the concepts of ‘sticky’ and 
‘leaky’ knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 2001) are viewed as fundamentally 
important. Although the benefits of collaboration, listed above, are seen as 
desirable this does not mean that organizations are always prepared to share 
everything when working together. Whilst discussions of sticky knowledge 
(von Hippel, 1994; 1999) have tended to focus upon the difficulty of retaining 
and disseminating knowledge within organizations, ‘leakiness’, by contrast, 
has generally focused on the external and undesirable flow of knowledge from 
organizations, to competitors (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 199). Here, to prevent 
knowledge spontaneously overflowing, the emphasis is placed upon the 
creation and maintenance of boundaries – ‘protective governance structures’ 
(Williamson, 1981) or ‘regimes of appropriability’ (Teece, 1986).   
 
Brown and Duguid critique this understanding of sticky and leaky knowledge 
by arguing that focusing solely upon knowledge is somewhat unsatisfactory 
as ‘exactly the same knowledge can prove both sticky and leaky’ (2001: 199), 
as studies of ‘fissioning’ (Zeigler, 1985) and second mover advantage (Teece, 
1986) demonstrate. As an alternative Brown and Duguid argue that by 
focusing on social practice, informed by social and cultural studies of 
knowledge and learning, the apparent paradox of sticky and leaky knowledge 
is overcome. Hence, knowledge is re-positioned as intimately related to actual 
practices within communities of practice. Resultantly, knowledge circulates 
both internally and externally through networks of associations and is not a 
property of any particular firm (2001: 209), but rather one that, in part, draws 
upon much broader structures.  
 
Although we agree with Brown and Duguid that focusing exclusively on 
knowledge is unsatisfactory, this paper develops a different line of critique. 
What is left unresolved by Brown and Duguid is the issue of knowledge and 
information ‘leakiness’ in the context of inter-organizational relations. This 
paper follows Marchington and Vincent , who note that wider institutional 
forces that help to shape inter-organizational relations are neglected by much 
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of the strategic management and economics literature. Consequently, in order 
to address the leakage of knowledge and contribute to our understanding of 
inter-organizational learning this paper seeks to examine some of the forces 
that shape inter-organizational relations. 
 
Specifically, this paper explores the notion of leakiness in the inter-
organizational learning field by focusing on deliberate attempts to force leaks 
of knowledge and information. First this paper considers the problems 
associated with knowledge and information protection, before challenging the 
view that leakage is primarily an internal phenomenon. To demonstrate the 
limitations of the current understanding of knowledge leakiness this paper 
introduces evidence of deliberate attempts to learn across organizational 
boundaries through economic and industrial espionage. Consequently, this 
paper seeks to contribute to the field of inter-organizational learning by 




The Problems of Protecting Knowledge 
 
The practical problems of knowledge protection have already been well 
documented by Liebeskind (1996). They are two-fold (for a more detailed 
review of the issues see e.g. Cheung, 1982; Friedman et al., 1991). Firstly, 
the obvious protections, the recourse to law and the use of property rights, are 
fraught with difficulties: patents, copyrights and trade secrets are all narrowly 
defined, expensive to initiate and administer, and even more expensive to 
enforce (see e.g. Mansfield, 1985). Secondly, even when recourse to law can 
be sought such action is premised upon the fact that an infringement has 
taken place. Unlike other organisational assets, knowledge can be made 
mobile (the objective of the much of the ‘stickiness’ literature) and requires 
deliberate action to prevent such mobility or ‘leakiness’ (Liebeskind, 1996). 
However, it is difficult to detect such expropriation or imitation as a result of 
the very nature of knowledge as Brown and Duguid (2001) demonstrate.   
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‘Leakiness’: Osmosis or Theft? 
 
 The metaphor of ‘leak’ may well be one that was conjured up from plumbing 
origins. Here knowledge is regarded as flowing (ideally) merely within the 
social network of pipes that make up the organization.  Leakage is regarded 
as being primarily the function of an internal ‘blockage’ (of ideas) e.g. in the 
case of ‘fissioning’ (Zeigler, 1985), However, in the case of second mover 
advantage (Teece, 1986), which Brown and Duguid employ in their 
discussion, the metaphor does, admittedly, break-down. Nevertheless, it does 
serve to illustrate the point that leakage is regarded as being internally 
generated. 
 
The point that we make here is that these authors are themselves guilty of the 
very same error that they attribute to those who adopt a socio-cultural 
perspective of knowledge. Proponents are accused of adopting a ‘black-box 
model of organizations, where the inside is somehow free of all the forces at 
work on the outside’ (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 200). More recent studies have 
served to problematize the degree to which organizations are not impacted by 
such exogenous forces. In particular, this ‘black-box’ mindset has been 
challenged by drawing attention to the liminality of temporary workers  the 
tensions surrounding intersecting group affiliations , and the creation of 
learning boundaries in project-based learning . What these studies indicate is 
that, given the increasing mobility of workers and the diversity of 
contemporary working practices, external factors do significantly influence 
learning both within and between organizations.  
 
However improved our knowledge of learning across boundaries has become, 
such contemporary debates are still afflicted by an intellectual myopia – 
namely that studies focus on positive, legitimate forms of collaborative activity 
and thereby neglect illegitimate learning across boundaries. In an attempt to 
address this lacuna this paper explores illegitimate learning across 
boundaries, specifically that of economic and industrial espionage. In 
subsequent sections we demonstrate that the debate surrounding sticky and 
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leaky knowledge can be greatly enhanced by the acknowledgement and 
addressing of such knowledge theft.  
 
Before exploring the incidence, cost and history of knowledge theft as 
espionage we need to clarify a distinction. Following Nasheri (2005) this paper 
presents economic espionage as involving a government’s efforts to collect 
information, appropriate trade secrets, and steal knowledge.  Industrial 
espionage is thus viewed as an organizational phenomenon, with the same 






When we think of espionage many of us will recall memories of the trashy spy 
thrillers and tacky Bond films of our halcyon youth. Few of us will give the 
subject any serious attention, especially in consideration of the more serious 
business of ‘Business’. Yet economic espionage, as we shall subsequently 
see, has a very long history and pedigree.  
 
More currently, however, in the US economic espionage is deemed so 
important that the President is compelled by law1 to annually submit to 
Congress updated information on the threat to domestic industry from foreign 
economic data collection and industrial espionage. The President’s report to 
Congress is informed by ongoing work conducted by the US Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), who estimated that in 1997 the theft of formulas, 
process information, blueprints, business plans, and customer lists cost US 
industries approximately $250 billion per year (Shanley & Crabb, 1998).  
 
A subsequent study, conducted by the American Society for Industrial 
Security (ASIS) and consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, concluded that 
                                                 
1 The President is legally compelled to report to Congress by the ‘Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995’, 
Section 809(b), Public Law 103-359. 
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during 1999 Fortune 1000 companies sustained losses in excess of $45 
billion as a result of the theft of proprietary information (ASIS, 2000)2. This 
investigation further revealed that 44 of the 97 survey participants reported a 
total of more than 1,000 separate instances of such theft, resulting in an 
estimated loss per incident in excess of $500,000. Although considerable, 
these figures pale into insignificance when compared to the average of $15 
million in lost business reported by high technology firms in the same survey 
(Hemphill, 2002). 
 
Other studies have indicated that economic espionage is a global problem. In 
1998 the FBI identified 23 nation-states as hijacking sensitive trade secrets to 
gain competitive advantage (FBI, 1998)3. Even more recently, the US 
identified foreign individuals, from both the private and public sectors, in 
almost 100 countries and how they have attempted to acquire sensitive US 
technologies in the fiscal year 2004 (ONCIX, 2005: ix). According to these 
official sources this has: 
 
Resulted in an erosion of US military advantage, and a degradation of the US 
Intelligence Community’s ability to provide information to policymakers, and undercut 
US industry. 
 
Although the United States claims to have suffered most as a result of trade 
secret and technology theft, 2004 saw a number of other countries suffering 
similarly in consequence of foreign economic espionage. ONCIX (2005: 15) 
examples include the following incidents: 
 
China: In April 2004, a court in China sentenced a former engineer from a Wuhan 
Iron & Steel Company to 18 years in jail for taking bribes and industrial espionage, 
according to press reports. The individual was found guilty of selling sensitive 
corporate information to an unidentified foreign company bidding for the project to 
produce high-end steel products and cold-rolled steel sheet. The foreign company 
accused of receiving the information reportedly pulled out of the bidding process after 
the individual was arrested. 
                                                 
2 In the follow up survey, conducted in 2001, this figure was estimated to have risen to between $53 and $59 billion. 
3 Ironically, the vast majority of these nations identified were previously trained by U.S. intelligence services 
(Frauman 1997). 
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 Russia: In April 2004, Russia’s Federal Security Service claimed to have uncovered 
an industrial espionage network that was preparing to pass information on Russia’s 
satellite program to the Chinese. The theft would have enabled China to close the 
gap with Russia in satellite production and delivery, according to press reports. 
 
South Korea: In mid-2004, a South Korean employee of a Hong Kong based cell 
phone distributor was arrested on charges of espionage for attempting to give 75,000 
internal computer files from a South Korean handset maker to a Hong Kong firm. The 
computer files contained secret information about the South Korean company’s 
technology for making mobile phones. Prosecutors estimated that if the information 
had leaked, it would have cost the company $3.8 billion in lost exports. 
 
Given the extent of the problem, and the cost to individuals, organizations, 
and nation states, one would expect economic espionage to merit serious 
academic study. Yet critical, and for that matter, even mainstream orthodox 
accounts of business and management appear to be virtually oblivious to the 
existence and range of economic espionage. Apart from the difficulty in 
conducting empirical research into such practices (Punch, 1996), one reason 
for this paucity of interest could be that economic espionage is a new 
phenomenon, perhaps a consequence of rediscovering the value of 
knowledge in today’s societies. 
 
Historical evidence of economic and industrial espionage 
 
The claim of espionage being a new phenomenon can be swiftly discounted. 
It has been claimed that the history of this phenomena could extend back to 
pre-historic times with the quest for the secret of fire between competing 
nomadic tribes (Rosny, 1967). Bergier (1977) even cites an example from the 
Old Testament (Numbers, ch. XIII) in which God commanded Moses to send 
the leaders of the twelve tribes of Israel to spy upon the land of Canaan. 
 
More factually, perhaps, Jeremy (1981) notes that as early as the 1780’s 
Britain had passed rigorous patent laws and banned the exportation of cotton-
making technology. As a result of this legislation skilled technicians convicted 
of taking such knowledge abroad had their property summarily confiscated by 
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the crown (Jeremy, 1981: 36). At the same time France made the export of 
lace-making expertise a capital crime punishable by death (Davenport and 
Prusak, 2000: 16). Even the American Constitution provides an example of 
the early recognition of the value of knowledge, as Article I (Section 8) 
authorizes Congress to enact suitable patent legislation (Nonaka and Teece, 
2001: 1). The reason such measures were created is obvious. Even at this 
early stage of development in Western societies economic espionage existed.  
 
Evidence of the incidence of economic espionage activity can be found 
throughout history. For example, Landes (1999: 276) observes that in early 
eighteenth century France explorers were sent out to acquire British 
technologies, including in 1718 a systematic pursuit of British technicians 
specializing in clock and watchmakers, woollen workers, glassmakers, and 
shipbuilders. In consequence of these and other efforts, legislation was 
immediately enacted making it illegal to entice abroad any skilled worker in 
‘wool, iron, steel, brass or metal, or any clockmaker or watchmaker, or any 
other artificer or manufacturer of Great Britain’ (Harris, 1998: 9). This looting 
of British technology was, according to Fialka (1997: xi), taken up in 1811 by 
Francis Cabot Lowell (after whom the city of Lowell. Massachusetts was 
named in recognition of such efforts). This ‘enterprising’ American visited 
Scotland and England specifically to surreptitiously acquire knowledge of 
water-powered mills and cotton-making technology (especially the Cartwright 
loom), an expropriation of knowledge without recompense. ‘The magnitude of 
what Lowell achieved has few parallels, even in science fiction’ (Fialka, 1997: 
xiii): he, almost single-handedly, successfully transferred Britain’s textile 
manufacturing industry to America (Mendell, 2003). Indeed, at that time, 
America actively supported and encouraged the piracy of all European 
technology in order to support its economic growth and fledgling 
independence (Ben-Atar, 2004). Lowell succeeded despite the fact that British 
mill owners were often obsessed with secrecy: publication of technological 
innovation was suppressed; they moved goods and machinery in and out of 
their factories at night and via the back door; doors were kept locked; and 
‘many a mill resembled a medieval fortification with perimeter walls and 
gatehouse’ (Jeremy, 1996: 215). 
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 Many other examples can be found in the many and various literatures 
dealing with the diffusion of technological innovations (see e.g. Woolrich, 
1986), particularly those that could be defined contemporarily as ‘leading 
edge’ (Harris, 1998). For example, in an exchange of letters Watt and Boulton 
(famous as steam engine ‘inventors’), after the former had obtained 
information about the patented engine of John Hornblower of 1775, discussed 
possible modifications to their engine with a view to the claiming the re-design 
as their own and invalidating the originator’s patent (Torrens, 1982). Such was 
the desire of Watt and Boulton to succeed in this illegal endeavour that they 
even bribed the engineman of Hornblower’s engine to give them further 
information on their competitor’s machine and its performance (Torrens, 
1980). 
 
The porcelain industry, in particular, regularly engaged in such illegal 
knowledge acquisition activities (see e.g. Savage, 1952; Savage, 1961 for 
detailed discussions of examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries). Although patents for the “the mistery of transparent earthenware, 
comonly knowne by the names of Porcelaine or China” were taken out as 
early as 1671 by John Dwight (Jewitt, 1985: 75), the process of making ‘true’ 
porcelain was first stolen from the Chinese and introduced into Europe by a 
Jesuit, Father d’Entrecolles who visited the city of King-to-tchen and 
described it in letters of September 1712 and January 1722 (Bergier, 1975). 
From then, until the process became ‘common knowledge’, those engaged in 
porcelain making regularly stole secret formulas from each other and even 
copied the designs of their more famous counterparts (especially Meissen) 
and used their trade marks (Savage, 1952; 1961). The same theft was 
widespread in France’s porcelain industry: the most prolific forger of many 
was the factory of St. Amand-les-Eaux which produced fakes of the wares of 
Sevres, St. Cloud and Chantilly (Savage, 1969). 
 
Jewitt (1985 75-6) cites a contemporary source “Shaw” to give an early 
example of the extent of such knowledge theft, from the (ineffective) 
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precautions taken by the Eler (or Elers) brothers soon after setting up their 
pottery at Bradwell at the end of the seventeenth century:  
 
In vain did they adopt measures for self-protection in regard to their manipulations, by 
employing an idiot to turn the thrower’s wheel, and the most ignorant and stupid 
workmen to perform the laborious operations, and by locking up these persons while 
at work, and strictly examining each prior to quitting the manufactory at night – all 
their most important processes were however developed…  
 
Two potters named Astburry and Twyford were responsible for overcoming 
such precautions (Jewitt, 1985). Even the great Josiah Wedgwood was not 
immune to such problems. In a letter dated 20 October 1789, written to Sir 
John Dalrymple, he lamented about the activities of a one Jon Matthias 
Ljunberg, Professor of Mathematics and Philospohy at Kiel University (cited 
by Woolrich, 1986: 37): 
 
Our pottery here is at this time in a considerable ferment, occasioned by a person 
having lately been detected in seducing and bribing our workmen to give him 
drawings of our kilns, samples of our clays and raw materials, and specimens of our 
goods in difft. stages of mfre. The person made good his escape, but we are 
endeavouring to take and prosecute him. The foreign agent, for such he proves to be 
has been 16 years in England employed upon the same plan respecting the difft. mfrs 
of G. B. and has taken drawings of our machinery for mining and Mfres from Cornwall 
to Yorkshire.  
  
Such instances in the porcelain industry represent just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ 
(Young, 1999). What these contemporary (ONCIX, 2005) and historical 
examples (Fialka, 1997; Jeremy, 1981; Landes, 1999) demonstrate is 
deliberate strategic knowledge acquisition, by learning across organizational 
and nation state boundaries, has been around for centuries and continues 
today. As yet management scholars have failed to address this gap in our 
understanding of inter-organizational learning.  
 
Where some evidence exists of the exploration of the issues relating to 
espionage, both industrial and economic, is in the area of white collar crime 
within the sociology and criminology literatures and, as we have already 
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remarked, within those dealing with the diffusion of technological innovations. 
Here, however, economic espionage, or Trade Secret theft as it is often 
referred to, is seen as occurring in consequence of one or both of two 
particular motivations: either a disgruntled employee misappropriates the 
company’s trade secrets for his/her own financial benefit or to harm their 
employer or else a competitor of the company or a foreign nation 
misappropriates the trade secret to advance its own financial interests 
(Nasheri, 2005: 7).  
 
In order to address the gap in our knowledge of inter-organizational learning, 
and to connect management research with sociological insights, the 
remainder of this paper explores three vignettes to indicate what could be 
discovered about learning across boundaries from focused investigation of 
industrial and economic espionage. By exploring these aspects we discover a 




Our first vignette concerns a medical research project, undertaken in 
Cleveland Ohio, into Alzheimer’s disease. Fink (2002) reports a series of 
events involving two Japanese clinical researchers, one a 40-year-old 
neuroscience researcher from the Japan Institute of Physical and Chemical 
Research (known in Tokyo as Riken), the other a 39-year-old clinical 
researcher at the Kansas University Medical College. 
 
After an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, law authorities in the 
USA filed charges in May against two Japanese scientists for the alleged theft of DNA 
samples from an Alzheimer’s disease research project. At the centre of the “DNA spy” 
controversy is Takashi Okamoto — a graduate of Tokyo University and a scholar at 
Harvard — who worked at the Cleveland Clinic in the USA from January, 1997, to 
July, 1999. 
 
Okamoto is alleged to have secretly sent DNA samples and cell-line reagents to 
Riken, a quasi-governmental Japanese body, shortly before returning to his home 
country. According to an indictment filed by Ohio State prosecutors, Okamoto 
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attempted to cover his tracks by destroying research material and by switching the 
stolen samples with test tubes filled with tap water. The change was noticed by junior 
researchers at the Cleveland laboratory, who reported their suspicions to the US 
authorities. 
 
According to the indictment, in or about April 1999, Riken offered Okamoto a position 
to commence in the autumn of 1999. Okamoto accepted. On or about the 8th and 9th 
of July 1999 Okamoto and a third person misappropriate DNA and cell line reagents 
and constructs from the Cleveland Clinic. Okamoto stored four boxes containing the 
stolen DNA with a colleague in Kansas. Okamoto resigned from the Cleveland clinic 
on the 26th July 1999 and started his new position in Japan with Riken. In August 
1999 Okamoto returned to the US to retrieve the stolen DNA. Okamoto left the US 
later that month with the stolen DNA and cell line reagents 
 
An FBI investigation found that the espionage carried out by Okamoto and his alleged 
accomplice, Hiroaki Serizawa had caused US$2 million worth of damage to the 
Cleveland Clinic. On the 8th of May 2001 a grand jury in Cleveland, Ohio returned a 
four-count indictment against Okamoto.  
  
 (Fink, 2002; Nasheri, 2005: 143-5 ) 
 
 
Motivation of individuals to commit acts of espionage 
 
Discerning the motivation for Okamoto is a complex matter because a number 
of aspects could be equally important. Firstly, as Lehrer and Asakawa (2003) 
note, members of intersecting groups with different affiliations can suffer great 
tension. Okamoto is simultaneously a member of a scientific community, has 
allegiance to his Japanese employers, and allegiance to the research project. 
As a scientist Okamoto is used to sharing knowledge with the broader 
scientific community, and as such practice is arguably the basis of scientific 
endeavour, community membership encourages the leakage of communal 
knowledge. Merton (1968: 601) clarifies this communal understanding of 
knowledge in science thus: 
 
The substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are 
assigned to the community. They constitute a common heritage in which the equity of 
the individual producer is severely limited. An eponymous law or theory does not 
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enter into the exclusive possession of the discoverer and his heir, nor do the muses 
bestow on him special rights of use and disposition. 
 
It could therefore be argued that Okamoto was acting in the public interest by 
attempting to deliberately ‘leak’ knowledge of the research to prevent 
exclusive ownership claims by the Cleveland Clinic. What Okamoto could be 
experiencing is the tension resulting from the increasing encroachment of 
market relations into scientific communities (O’Neill, 1998). In such 
circumstances Nelkin (1984) notes that conflicts of interest are bound to arise 
because “the academic responsibility of open communication inevitably 
conflicts with the commercial responsibility to maintain secrecy” (Nelkin, 1984: 
25).  
 
In addition to the considerable tensions associated with scientific community 
membership, Okamoto is also faced with the dilemma of opposing loyalties. 
Although temporarily employed in America, Okamoto is a Japanese national, 
most recently employed by a quasi-governmental agency. It appears that his 
loyalty to Japan outweighed his loyalty to his previous employers. This is 
perhaps to be expected, if not condoned, if we consider the influence of 
Japanese government agencies on espionage activity. 
 
Fialka (1997: 44) draws our attention to JETRO, the Japan External Trade 
Organization, which uses partial funding from the Japanese government to 
train people how and where to look for new technology. This Japanese 
‘technology lust’ (Fialka, 1997) has seen huge numbers of Japanese students 
being trained in US universities to become the researchers of the future. 
During 1990, for example, 29,840 Japanese students attended US 
institutions, whereas only 1,485 American students studies in Japan (Fialka, 
1997: 151). Okamoto is the product of this experience, and could feasibly 
have been briefed to secure prior research samples for Riken. 
 
Inter-organizational learning facilitated by the act of espionage 
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If Okamoto had been successful in removing DNA samples a quasi-
governmental Japanese body would have learned everything that an 
American research centre had taken time and money to discover.  The DNA 
samples and cell line reagents represent the product of substantial research 
and development investment by the Cleveland Clinic. By employing Okamoto, 
Riken not only reduced the research costs involved in producing the DNA and 
cell line reagents, but also had access to the tacit and codified knowledge 
associated with the original research. If seen as an exercise in learning across 
organizational boundaries alone, thereby ignoring the illegality of the actions, 
Riken has secured the advantages of collaboration without any of the costs. 
 
The theft of DNA samples itself raises real concerns regarding commercial 
competition between nation states. In this particular case Okamoto’s actions 
indicate that scientific collaboration for the good of human kind could 
sometimes be relegated by commercial interest. The implications of this are 
wide ranging, and question the future of scientific work in commercial arenas 
where market mechanisms apply. If it could be demonstrated that the 
Japanese Government took overt steps to encourage the theft of materials 
then we could argue, given the US research data presented earlier, that the 
economic prosperity of nations is seriously affected by espionage. What this 
means is that ‘knowledge stickiness’ is a matter of national security. The issue 




Our second vignette concerns the practice of competitive tendering for 
government contracts reported by Swartz (2003). In this particular case the 
US Air Force put out to tender contracts for rocket-launchers valued at $2 
billion. What follows is an example of what can happen when employees feel 
wrongfully dismissed.  
 
Krishnan Raghavan, a former employee of Boeing, alleged he was wrongfully fired 
after he told Boeing managers that a colleague – Dean Farmer, a former Lockheed 
employee, had propriety documents. Farmer reportedly brought the documents – 
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8,800 pages – with him to Boeing from Lockheed. According to letters from Boeing 
lawyers to Lockheed lawyers, Boeing fired Farmer in 2001 after an internal 
investigation found that he had sent propriety Lockheed documents to eight Boeing 
employees, including Raghavan. Raghavan claimed to have alerted Boeing’s ethics 
office after receiving 40 Lockheed slides from Farmer that contained secret Lockheed 
financial and bidding information.  
 
In an investigation the US Air Force found that Boeing had acquired 25,000 Lockheed 
documents during the 1998 competition. The Air Force said it would shift seven 
rocket launch contracts valued at $1 billion from Boeing to Lockheed and suspend 
three former employees and three Business units of Boeing Integrated Defence 
Systems from further government work until corrective action is taken.   
 
(Adapted from Swartz, 2003: 16) 
 
 
Motivation of individuals to commit acts of espionage 
 
Dean Farmer’s actions can be seen as premeditated because the confidential 
documents he sent to colleagues in Boeing were already in his possession 
when he joined the organization. The central question here is why Farmer 
chose to take propriety information regarding his former employer’s financial 
and tendering plans with him when he left. One possible explanation is that 
Farmer recognised the value of such knowledge and used this for internal 
self-promotion. It is possible, if highly unlikely, that Farmer did not fully 
appreciate the situation and was merely trying to be helpful. Given the value 
of the contracts involved this is implausible. Consequently we have to explore 
the possibility that Boeing sought to discover Lockheed’s plans for the tender 
and took the opportunity to hire an ex-employee, hoping that Farmer would 
bring with him inside knowledge of the tenders. The discovery of codified 
knowledge in his possession could have been seen as a bonus, and may 
even have constituted part of his employment deal. Either way, our 
understanding of sticky knowledge has to be adapted.  When we think about 
employee mobility we may accept that tacit knowledge sticks with an 
individual. This vignette demonstrates that sometimes codified knowledge 
also sticks to individuals when they shift employment.  
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 Inter-organizational learning facilitated by the act of espionage 
 
This vignette emphasises a different facet of competition in knowledge-driven 
economies, and a different type of inter-organizational learning. Contra the 
emphasis placed on ‘know-how’ by practice-based theorists (), this example 
vividly demonstrates the importance and value of ‘know-what’. In situations 
where a number of organizations possess the requisite ‘know-how’, ‘know-
what’ become vitally important. By ‘know-what’ we mean that organizations 
can make strategically informed choices to undercut competitors when placing 
tenders for lucrative contracts if they know competitors plans, and make 
adjustments to their own bids accordingly. The value of knowing what a 
competitor is going to do in most cases is hard to quantify, but in this case it 
be suggested by the US Air Force’s reaction upon discovering the espionage - 
$1 billion.  
 
Given the findings of the US Air Force investigation, and the fact that 25,000 
Lockheed documents were discovered in Boeing, we can assume that the 
Farmer case is not an isolated incident. This raises serious questions as to 
the nature of Boeing’s organizational culture. In the case of organizational 
culture contributing to illegal acts Stone (1975) suggests the following factors 
may be involved: 
 
A desire for profits, expansion, power; desire for security (at corporate as well as 
individual levels); fear of failure (particularly in connection with shortcomings in 
corporate innovativeness); group loyalty identification (particularly in connection with 
citizenship violations and the various failures to ‘come forward’ with internal 
information); feelings of omniscience (in connection with inadequate testing); 
organizational diffusion of responsibility (in connection with the buffering of public 
criticism); corporate ethnocentricism (in connection with limits in concern for public’s 
wants and desires)  
(Stone, 1975: 236 as cited in Punch, 1996: 225) 
 
Clearly Boeing demonstrates a number of these characteristics in the 
evidence provided, and yet there is the larger question of the impact of such 
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activity on national security. Given that the espionage is industrial rather than 
state sponsored, it may initially appear odd to talk about national security, and 
yet we have to consider the implications of Lockheed’s actions. If sensitive 
information was so readily available as this vignette suggests, then we have 
to question how easy it would be for foreign organizations to acquire such 
knowledge. Lockheed, a regular governmental contractor, clearly has serious 
security issues to deal with. If one of its main US rivals could obtain 25, 000 
internal documents containing sensitive information, then how easy is it to 
obtain and transfer knowledge across organizational boundaries? The final 
vignette provides an indication to the relative ease of such knowledge 
transfer, and provides us with a final insight into internal espionage. 
 
The Glue Man 
 
The third vignette focuses on perhaps the most famous case of economic 
espionage - Four Pillars and Avery Dennison. The full features of the case are 
discussed in relation to risk and crisis management by Fink (2002). What is 
most striking about this case is the extent of the espionage conducted.    
 
 
Tenhong ‘Victor’ Lee (PhD), a Taiwan-born US educated chemical engineer, was 
employed as a Senior Research Engineer at Avery Dennison in Concord Ohio for 11 
years. Although Dr. Lee was a highly valued and trusted expert, working for a Fortune 
500 listed company specialising in self-adhesive products, Lee was a spy. For eight 
years, between 1989 and 1997, Dr. Lee conducted extensive espionage activities for 
his other employer – Four Pillars Enterprise Co. of Taipei Taiwan. During this period 
Four Pillars grew to become Avery Dennison’s leading competitor in Asia, despite 
Avery Dennison spending $200 million on research and development.    
 
Once discovered, the extent of Dr. Lee’s activities became apparent. In eight years 
Dr. Lee stole 12,000 research documents, 71 adhesive formulas, trade secret 
information relating to 37 speciality adhesive tapes and 20 label primers, Avery 
Dennison new products, and even gave seminars to Four Pillar scientists in 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1994 and 1996. Dr. Lee was finally discovered by chance, as a result of 
an employee of Four Pillars being legitimately hired by Avery Dennison. This ‘new 
hire’ instantly recognised Dr. Lee and alerted his new employer. During criminal and 
 Page 18 of 29 
civil proceedings it was discovered that Dr. Lee had received $160,000 over eight 
years for his extensive work. 
 




Motivation of individuals to commit acts of espionage 
 
Given that Dr. Lee spent six months confessing to his crimes, and six days 
giving court testimony, we can examine what drove this massive espionage 
effort. Dr. Lee maintained that he did not commit the crimes for financial 
benefit, and in support of this claim no evidence was ever found that Dr. Lee 
asked for payment of any kind. Dr. Lee had taken what had been offered. Dr. 
Lee claimed that he saw the Head of Four Pillars, a P.Y. Yang, like ‘a father 
he never had’ (Fink, 2002: 23), and that this was one of the main reasons for 
his activities. In addition to this, Dr. Lee claimed that in his native Taiwan the 
title of ‘consultant’ carried tremendous esteem, and that he had decided to act 
on the behalf of Four Pillars because of this kudos. Irrespective of the cultural 
pressure placed upon Dr. Lee, the claim that the title was a motivating factor 
is unlikely because only a handful of Four Pillars’ employees knew of Dr. 
Lee’s role. Fink (2002: 25) argues that ego and power made Dr. Lee do it, and 
we are inclined to agree.  
 
Inter-organizational learning facilitated by the act of espionage 
 
The extent of espionage conducted by Dr. Lee, summarised by Fink (2002: 
87-99), provides us with great detail. Dr. Lee started his espionage spree by 
sending a confidential training guide for pressure-sensitive adhesive 
technology. This was followed by technical details of mastercurves and 
accompanying formula, enabling Four Pillars to clone some of Avery 
Dennison’s most successful products. Not only could Four Pillars clone 
products, but with a slight change to the templates, could create unique 
products without having spent anything on research and development. Later 
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that same year Dr. Lee sent internal software, market test reports, sales data, 
and test samples. Effectively Four Pillars spent $160, 000 in eight years, and 
received $200 million worth of information.   
 
It is clear from the vignette, and associated court hearings, that Four Pillars 
recruited Dr. Lee specifically to supply as much technical information as 
possible. Again we discover the same motivational forces at work with this 
particular organization as we have found with our two prior vignettes. The 
organizational culture is clearly conducive to illegal activity, provided it directly 
benefits the organizational goals. The implication of this is that we can 
suggest that industrial espionage could be a deliberate organizational 
strategy.  
 
Although there is no suggestion of state involvement in this example, we still 
have to recognise the impact of Four Pillars espionage at nation state level. 
Four Pillars developed to become Avery Dennison’s main competitors in Asia, 
and as a result of this increased profitability would have increased national 
wealth, and may even have been heralded as an organization to emulate. If 
this were to happen it is feasible to suggest that national policy may follow this 
route. Given the USTR watch lists produced every year monitoring nation 
state infringements of the international TRIPs agreement (http: 
usinfo.state.gov), and the consistent lack of action undertaken by countries 
like Ukraine to address these infringements, a state strategy to force leaks is 
a plausible possibility as (Whitney and Gaisford, 1996) indicates.    
 
Analysis of vignettes 
 
As noted earlier, Nasheri (2005) suggests that three different units of analysis 
can be used to understand espionage activities. Espionage is conducted by 
individuals, organizations and nation states. The central motivation for all of 
these entities is presented as the desire to advance their own financial 
interests. When we look at the three vignettes presented we discover a 
different perspective on the sticky and leaky knowledge debate.  
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From the espionage perspective we learn that valuable ‘know-how’, 
associated with inter-organizational collaboration, and valuable ‘know-what’, 
associated with strategic management, is made to leak. Although the 
information on espionage presented in the three vignettes is very limited we 
can still suggest a number of factors that affect the stickiness and leakiness of 
knowledge at work both within and beyond organizational boundaries. What is 
most striking about the examples presented is the suggestion that, at the 
individual level, financial gain may not be the main motivation for conducting 
espionage. We can suggest different, non-financial, motivating factors for Dr. 
Okamoto, Mr. Farmer and Dr. Lee. This is not to discount the external 
influence of payment for espionage, because it may be one of the external 
forces at work, as the Glueman case indicates.  
 
However contra Nasheri (2005) there is no evidence to suggest that Okamoto, 
Farmer and Lee were disgruntled employees. In the DNA and Glueman cases 
we can suggest that the perpetrators may have suffered divided loyalties, and 
in all three vignettes evidence suggests that each individual may have had 
pressure to commit espionage applied by organizations. This insight 
repositions the notion of leaky knowledge because we are forced to accept 
that some organizations engage in activities to force leaks. 
 
At the organizational level the evidence suggests that all of the potential 
benefits of collaborative inter-organizational learning can be achieved by 
illegal means. In the Glueman case Four Pillars had access to the 
complementary assets needed to turn innovation into commercial success, 
reduced the R&D cost by paying a pittance direct to the thief, and through Dr. 
Lee had created a conduit for the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge. In 
this particular case the benefits of ‘know-how’ can clearly be achieved. 
 
In addition to the benefits associated with ‘know-how’ being available through 
espionage, the evidence presented also suggests the following benefits of 
inter-organizational learning by focusing on ‘know-what’. With the 
preoccupation with ‘practice’ so evident in contemporary discussion of 
learning (Brown and Duguid, 2001; Lave and Wenger, 1991) the commercial 
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value of knowing what competitors are planning to do, what new products and 
technologies are being developed, and what scientific research may offer 
business appears to have slipped off the research agenda. Yet espionage 
activity demonstrates that the old English adage that ‘forewarned is 
forearmed’ still has relevance, as some observers indicate (Johnson et al, 
2002; Blackler, 1995). This is most explicitly demonstrated by Boeing’s 
preoccupation with Lockheed’s financial and technical information relating to 
government tender applications.  
 
In each of the three vignettes organizational forces could be suggested as a 
reason why perpetrators committed espionage. Although the evidence is 
questionable in the case of Riken, both Boeing and Four Pillars sought and 
acted upon knowledge obtained through espionage activities. This 
observation suggests that certain organizational cultures could contribute to, 
or even encourage, illegal activity by employees.   
 
Although the notion of organizational culture is notoriously diffuse (Punch, 
1996: 225) there may be something about certain environments that make 
them conducive to illegal activity (Stone, 1975). This suggestion could be 
extended to include nation states, as the evidence provided by the FBI (1998; 
ONCIX, 2005: ix) indicates concerted efforts have been made to acquire 





The aim of this paper has been to develop our understanding of sticky and 
leaky knowledge in the context of inter-organizational learning. By drawing on 
data from economic and industrial espionage we attempt to offset the myopic 
focus on legitimate organizational activity to illustrate that contemporary 
debate could benefit from exploring understanding the illegal forms of inter-
organizational learning. Three vignettes capturing different aspects of 
economic and industrial espionage were presented to demonstrate the 
limitations of both our current conceptualisations of inter-organizational 
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learning and what motivates people to illegally acquire knowledge across 
organizational boundaries.  
 
Marchington and Vincent (2004) note that much of the strategic management 
and economics literature tends to focus at the organizational level, thereby 
neglecting wider institutional forces that help to shape inter-organizational 
relations. The vignettes presented here demonstrate that economic and 
industrial espionage are multi-level phenomena, with different aspects forming 
linkages across levels. By focusing on the different levels of analysis this 
paper seeks to overcome the limitations of mono-level readings to address 
sticky and leaky knowledge in inter-organizational learning.   
 
In direct challenge to the ‘black-box’ view of organizations presupposed by the 
sticky and leaky knowledge debate the vignettes present powerful evidence of 
external forces encouraging the forced leakage of knowledge. Resultantly our 
understanding of what constitutes sticky and leaky knowledge has to be 
adapted. Although we are aware that tacit knowledge sticks with the 
individual, the evidence suggests that sometimes codified knowledge also 
sticks to individuals when they shift employment. Rather than leaking 
knowledge the evidence provided suggests a third dimension - knowledge 
theft. 
 
From the examples of knowledge theft as economic and industrial espionage 
we have suggested that although financial advantage is often assumed to be 
the driving force behind illegal activity, the actual motivations of individuals, 
organizations and nation states are more complex. Drawing on our examples, 
it is clear that a range of different motivations could exist including loyalty, 
self-promotion, kudos, ego, being valued at work, and perhaps even altruism. 
 
For an organization or a nation state to obtain the potential benefits of 
collaboration, without having to expose themselves to potential knowledge 
leaks, what is required is the development an organizational/state culture at 
ease with espionage as a form of strategic knowledge acquisition, and to 
recruit employees who are likely to either infiltrate a competitor or pass on 
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secret internal documents of their prior employer. As outrageous as it sounds, 
the evidence suggests that this is happening in a number of industries. As to 
the real extent of this, we do not yet know.  
 
Resultantly, we would argue that empirical research is needed to address 
economic and industrial espionage at the individual, organizational and 
national levels. At the individual level we need to understand the particular 
and specific motivations for conducting espionage. At the organizational level 
we need to explore the extent of criminogenic organizations (Punch, 1996), 
organizational cultures that encourage and/or ignore espionage (Stone, 
1975), and the degree of institutionalised criminality within superficially 
legitimate organizations. At the state level we need to explore the relationship 
between nation states and economic espionage to attempt to understand the 
extent of the problem. Once we have a clearer understanding of the extent of 
the problem we would be able to explore the causes and effects of espionage 
on international trade and the competitive advantage of nations. If knowledge 
is the source of competitive advantage in the future we had better learn more 
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